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ABSTRACT 
The post-PC era of computing offers digital rhetors an opportunity to innovate their inventional 
approaches. The new era is one in which an ecology of networked, distributed, sensor-based 
devices amplify our perceptions of self and world by changing the ecological relations that define 
our connections to our techno-social environments. By extending Casey Boyle’s posthuman 
practice of rhetorical invention to the new computational era, rhetoricians can develop digital 
interactive projects that move participants by amplifying the choric bases of their perceptions of 
self and world. 
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EVERSION AND THE POST-PC ERA 
Since the era of the personal computer (PC) peaked over three decades ago, much innovative 
work related to popular computing has focused on smaller, less dramatic computers that are 
designed to support us peripherally, monitoring and responding to the relatively minor or 
mundane questions of the day. From Mark Weiser’s contributions to early work under the 
auspices of ubiquitous computing, early natural-user interface (NUI) design at Microsoft, and 
more recent initiatives like pervasive computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) have 
contributed to a shift away from the desktop computer, which enculturated us to a dualistic 
relationship between the virtual and the real. During the reign of the PC, the virtual realm of the 
computer was behind the screen, or inside the computer; the ‘real world’ was outside of it, the 
two separate and distinct. And popular depictions of the virtual during that era were expressive 
of the dualistic split between the two realms. Films like the Wachowski’s The Matrix reinforced 
this split (until the sequel), and William Gibson’s cyberspace was a distal realm, separate and 
distinct from ‘meatspace’. But even Gibson has recognized how far things have changed since 
the new era of popular computing has replaced the PC. In an Op-Ed in the New York Times, 
Gibson describes this distinction as follows [1]: 
Cyberspace, not so long ago, was a specific elsewhere, once we visited 
periodically, peering into it from the familiar physical world. Now cyberspace 
has everted. Turned itself inside out. Colonized the physical. 
The eversion about which Gibson wrote in 2010, which echoes scholarly work on hybrid space 
and mixed reality, is due largely to the change in the technical infrastructure, the “ecology of 
devices” in which we now live [2; p.15]. The small, smart, sensory-based, wireless, networked 
microcontrollers and -processes that are increasingly embedded in our everyday lives – in our 
homes and apartments, our cars, all kinds of built environments (airports, malls, office buildings, 
public bathrooms, subways, highways) to wearable technologies enbedded in sports equipment 
and clothing – contribute to what Gibson and scholar Steven E. Jones call our “everted lives.” In 
his 2014 book, The Emergence of Digital Humanities, Jones offers a useful elaboration on the 
techno-cultural context to which eversion refers [3; p.19]: 
The metaphor of eversion is particularly resonant, particularly useful, because 
it articulates a widely experienced shift in our collective understanding of the 
network during the last decade; inside out, from a world apart to a part of the 
world, from a transcendent virtual reality to mundane experience, from a 
mysterious invisible abstract world to a still mostly invisible (but real) 
data-grid that we move through everyday in the physical world. 
Jones’ depiction of the shift from a computational era characterized as an abstract, transcendent 
world apart (the PC era) to one that is combined with our everyday, physical world, especially in 
its more mundane moments, echoes Adam Greenfield’s depictions of what he calls everywares. 
Greenfield describes an ever-growing number of micro-devices serving us from the interstices of 
our daily routines. These devices are meant to sense and respond to the activities that we perform 
on our way to the things that matter, like automating the process of paying tolls on the highway 
with RFID-based devices, or quietly standing in the corner, waiting and listening until we ask 
them to relay to us the weather or a news update. They are an essential part of today’s data-grid, 
our contemporary techno-cultural infrastructure. 
These devices may not be as attention-getting or dramatic as personal computers. In fact, they 
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are oftentimes designed to be ignored, designed to be forgotten while they are supporting and 
maintaining the vectors and velocities of our quotidian lives; nonetheless, the make a profound 
contribution to our new perception of reality. When Gibson or Jones point to eversion, they are 
pointing to the recognition that some of what makes the virtual unreal during a PC era has mixed 
with the real in the era that has eclipsed it. This mixed, everted, post-PC techno-ecological world 
is the one in which rhetoric scholars and practitioners have an opportunity to innovate their 
approaches to invention and to what counts as a moving, rhetorical-engaging project. As I will 
argue shortly, Casey Boyle’s call for a posthuman rhetorical practice is a compelling way in 
which to engage with the dynamics of the post-PC ecology of devices in which we find ourselves 
increasingly connected and immersed. Working from Gilbert Simondon’s ontogenetic theory of 
becoming, Boyle develops an approach to rhetorical practice that leads to suasive movements of 
change in our perceptions of individual capacity by changing aspects of the affective capacity of 
the ecological milieu of which individuality is an expression. Change, in other words, does not 
originate in the all-too-Western belief in autonomous, rational self; rather, it begins in the 
ecological dynamic that in-forms individuality. When a digital rhetor designs an interactive 
media project, a rhetorically-engaging ecological experience, the user generates their own 
everting amplifications, thereby leading to changes in individual capacity. 
SENSORS AND ACTUATORS: AMPLIFICATION AND AFFECT 
Essential to the capacity of these devices to evert our lives are the sensors and actuators around 
which they are designed. Many of these devices rely on sensory data about the “real” or physical 
world, data which is then transduced through one or more actuators to then make a physical 
change in the world. For example, as daylight fades on a street, and the ambient light sensors in 
each of the street lamps are affected by that change, the lights-as-actuators affect the physical 
world when they turn on. This relationship between sensor and actuator in the device context is 
one of the key ways in which the blur between the virtual and the real is generated. These kinds 
of devices, which are invisible as infrastructure, change the way we perceive and feel our world, 
our capacities associated with our sense of self, and our expectations.  
To better understand the role of sensors in the post-PC era is the following opening from Jennifer 
Gabry’s book, How to Do Things with Sensors. Gabrys describes these devices in terms of their 
embeddedness in a network [4; p.1]: 
The world of sensors is one of amplified connections. Sensors are meant to join 
up and speed up, while also facilitating and enabling. Whether these functions 
pertain to adjusting the lighting levels or advancing political engagement, a 
quickening of activity is expected to unfold through sensors. 
To make changes to the ecology in which we are associated, sensory data is key. Sensory data is 
the initial connection with the physical world, which a computational system creatively 
transduces, subsequently sending it back through one or more actuators to the physical,. The 
process, from sensor to actuator, is how eversion is supported. Like a stitch in time, these devices 
introduce a different valence or capacity into the everyday structure of our lives. 
To build on the argument, regarding the need for innovation, sensors and actuators relates to 
Gilles Deleuze’s Spinoza-inspired definition of a body. In his essay, “Spinoza and Us,” Deleuze 
explains that, for Spinoza, the definition of a body is based on two propositions. The first is 
kinetic: “a body, however small it may be, is composed of an infinite number of particles; it is 
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the relations of motion and rest, of speeds and slowness between particles, that define a body” 
[5; p.123]. The second is concerned with its affective capacities: “a body affects other bodies, or 
is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a 
body in its individuality” [5; p.123]. Spinoza’s definition is like a two-dimensional visualization, 
the lines expressive of its kinetic and dynamic dimensions, waxing and waning with each passing 
moment. Importantly, the definition can be mapped on to most any object or event: an insect or 
animal, a poem, a melody, a gesture. In fact, Deleuze offers the following description of a body 
in his book on Nietzsche: “Every relationship of forces constitutes a body – whether it is 
chemical, biological, social or political. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon 
as they enter into a relationship” [5; p.37]. Returning to the street lamp – and focusing on the 
second axis, the photosensitive chemical in the sensor, cadmium sulfide (CdS), becomes a body 
under Deleuze’s definition in relation to the sun’s rays. During the day, when the number of 
photons hitting the semi-conductive powder are high, CdS allows electricity to flow freely across 
it. But when the sun goes down, and the number of photons affecting the powder are fewer, CdS 
acts as a resistor. A device designed to monitor the affective state of that CdS-photon body can 
transduce its affective state toward switching on or off the electricity from the city’s grid to the 
bulb that lights the street, which, too, can be defined as another kind of body. And from a 
broader point of view – and one that returns us to the level of a user’s experience of 
everywares – the feeling of well-being or safety that a pedestrian might experience when the 
street lamps begin illuminating the darkness of the street, can be viewed as another set of 
affective capacities, another ‘relationship of forces’ or body is amplified. 
The point of making the connection to Deleuze’s Spinozist body is that the devices that change 
the ecological arrangement with which we are connected are meant to be a part of the world, to 
affect aspects of our mundane, everyday routine, operating from the interstices. Those devices, 
due to the ways in which they augment or amplify aspects of our everyday life, demand a 
different approach to both valuing and working with them. When these post-PC technologies 
quietly monitor and respond to aspects of our life, they change the ecology that is the basis for 
our felt and perceived world, and that ecological change requires a different approach to 
invention, one that focuses on an alternative logic of engagement, a distinct way of thinking 
through things, a “bastard reasoning”. 
CONNECTING WITH THE CHŌRA 
The ancient notion of the chōra has found its way back into rhetoric theory as a way of engaging 
with the alternative logic of our emotions, feelings, and affect in a techno-ecological context, 
which is a context introduced, in large part, by the kinds of devices mentioned above. Thomas 
Rickert’s essay, “Toward the Chōra,” is an important contribution to these ends. In his essay, 
Rickert offers a close reading of the chora outside of its limited place in Aristotle’s philosophical 
system by focusing on the uses/difinitions offered by Plato and much later Julia Kristeva, 
Jacques Derrida, and the American scholar Gregory Ulmer. 
In regards to the latter scholars uses of it, Rickert writes the following [6; p.252]: 
[T]he chōra transforms our senses of beginning, creation, and invention by 
placing them concretely within material environments, informational spaces, 
and affective (or bodily) registers. Thus, [Kristeva, Derrida, and Ulmer] are 
interested in how the chōra as an ancient line of thinking can iluminate 
contemporary concerns. 
Eversion, ecology, touch, and rain: A post-PC rhetoric 
5 
For Rickert, the material environments and information spaces in which we find ourselves today 
challenge rhetoricians to develop new methods of inquiry – specifically inventional methods that 
do not rely on the classical, Aristotelian topoi or on modern incarnations of it, like Kenneth 
Burke’s pentad. These approaches work well within language-based systems designed for 
“discursive, print-based notions of representation and rationality” [6; p.252], Rickert reminds us. 
But in a post-PC era, these “bookish” approaches are not resilient enough to match the new 
dynamics of distributed and networked spaces that the ecology of devices has introduced. It turns 
out that a shift away from the Aristotelian legacy of the topoi for the older notion of the chora 
resonates more productively with the dynamic and generative experience of space found within 
an era of eversion. In what follows, I will focus on Plato and Kristeva. 
In Rickert’s reading and summary of recent scholarship about the Platonic dialogue, Timaeus, in 
which the chora is discussed at length, the term relates to a theory of creation that begins not 
from a fixed, stable starting point but rather a “distribution (or matrix) of beginnings” [6; p.257]. 
The Platonic chora is more like a receptacle or matrix comprising a complex distribution of 
forces. It the source of all becomings, but it does not resemble that which emerges from it. It is 
elusive, hidden from direct view. It is the source of creation, but it exceeds the scope of the 
human intellect. It would seem to have a lot in common with the way affect is described by 
Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth in their introduction to their collection, The Affect 
Theory Reader [7; p.1]: 
Affect, at its most anthropomorphic, is the name we give to those forces –
 visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, 
vital forces insisting beyond emotion – that can serve to drive us toward 
movement, toward thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in 
neutral) across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even 
leave us overwhelmed by the world’s apparent intractability. 
It is for this reason that the chora requires a different approach to reasoning, since it is 
expressive of a different logic, a “bastard reasoning,” as it is described in Plato’s dialogue 
[6; p.259, 8; 51a-51b, 8; 52b]. 
For Kristeva, in works like Revolution in Poetic Language, the chora is used in association with 
what she calls the semiotic realm. Kristeva posits two realms, the symbolic and semiotic. The 
symbolic realm is the realm of language and meaning. The semiotic is the realm of the 
“emotions, sensations, and other marks and traces of psychical and material experience” 
[6; pp.260-261]. In an article that includes both a summary of an application of Kristeva’s theory 
of the chora, Brian L. Ott and Diane Marie Keeling offer the following explanation [9; p.366]: 
Adapting Plato’s conception, Kristeva understands the chora as the 
undifferentiated state between mother and infant prior to the acquisition of 
lanauge and the paternal law. It is a womb-like enclosure - a sonorous envelope 
in which the prenatal and newborn infant feels at one with the sounds and 
sensations of the mother. .For Kristeva, the chora corresponds to and enables 
the semiotic (or nonreferential) dimensions of rhetoric. 
For Kristeva, as an infant acquires language, the vital and original significance of the semiotic is 
largely forgotten, the role of the symbolic largely eclipsing it. But the semiotic cannot be 
completely ignored. Without the chora, the humanities and sciences are little more than 
“archivistic, archaeological, and necrophiliac” [6; p.261, 10; p.13]. The chora is a necessary and 
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vital “extra-linguistic” dimension of human life, including artistic and intellectual creativity. As 
Kristeva argues in Revollution in Poetic Language, it is an essential source of avant-garde 
literature, poetry, and other experimental realms. 
Traditional approaches to communication and invention rely on a stable, autonomous self who 
exists separate and distinct from the world, and whose individuality is predicated on a rational 
mind that communicates through language. It is a traditional subject propped up by a host of 
dualisms that work in parallel, and which include mind/body, inside/outside, truth/appearance, 
and more. Like conceptual scaffolding, these dualisms uphold a subject who is meant to be 
autonomous, individual, and rational. But as the dualisms that prop up this subject become 
blurred in a techno-cultural era based on an ecology of devices that contribute to eversion, an 
alternative conceptualization of self is required. Rickert writes, “In the new spatial paradigm, 
minds are both embodied, and hence grounded in emotion and sensation, and dispersed into the 
environment itself, and hence no longer autonomous” [6; p.251]. 
A focus on the chora is a step toward appreciating the complex, generative dimensions and 
capacities of the distributed set of forces comprising the ecology of devices that are everting the 
spaces in which we live and work. 
The next step is to work toward a sense of practice. How, in other words, can digital rhetoricians 
innovate traditional practices based in the symbolic realm in order to work alongside the 
capacities of the choric ecology of post-PC devices everting our lives? For a possible answer to 
that question, I turn to Casey Boyle’s Rhetoric and Posthuman Practice. 
A POSTHUMAN APPROACH TO POST-PC RHETORICS 
In his approach to rhetorical practice, Boyle relies on the same definition of the 
Deleuzian-Spinozist body, linking it to his approach. For example, Boyle writes, “this project 
finds the body, any body, to be a set of tendencies that affects others and is affected by others. In 
this way, a body cannot be neatly defined except as a relational process, one that emerges with and 
through practices” [11; p.5]. In this definition, Boyle references implicitly the second dynamic 
proposition from Spinoza’s definition. For Boyle, a posthuman approach to rhetorical practice is 
derived in part from relational (read: networked and distributed) forces comprising human and 
non-human “actors.” It’s an approach that adopts in order to better respond to the changing 
dynamics of the post-PC era, which is an era in which a perceived change has occurred between 
self and world, which is epitomized by the experience of eversion. In fact, echoing some of the 
same techno-cultural context that Rickert described at the beginning of his article, Boyle writes, 
“Increasingly compounded by digital forms of mediation, our fast-evolving information moment 
interrupts long-standing divisions between human subjects and nonhuman objects” [11; p.6] (my 
emphasis). With this interruption in mind, Boyle offers an approach to rhetorical practice and 
invention that is meant to work from within this moment of perceived eversion. 
Boyle’s approach to practice is strongly influenced by Gilbert Simondon’s work. He draws on a 
wide range of Simondon’s theories. For the purposes of this essay, I will focus on the following 
three ideas: Simondon’s ontogenetic approach to individualization, his theory transduction (and 
information), and his description of the ways in which individuality emerges and continues to 
transform toward new individualizations from a choric-like process of in-formation born of a 
metastable milieu. 
Regarding his ontogenetic approach, Boyle explains that Simondon downplays the historical 
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interest in ontology in favor of ontogenetics. The difference is that the latter foregrounds the 
ongoing process of change and becoming, past, present, and future, that defines an individual’s 
current state. For Simondon, an ontological approach to individuality tends to “elevate a 
principle of individuation over a process of individuation” [12; p.76]. This is a problem because 
the former does not adequately account for the ways in which individuality comes to be, and how 
that being is continually in-formed by “‘other influences’ that Simondon claims could be 
‘equally important to the emergence of that individuated being” [12; p.76]. An ontological 
approach begins with a finished product (of individualization) and reverse engineers a 
description of the origins its form from the principles and properties comprising that final 
version. Harkening back to the role of the chora, we could say that the ontological approach does 
not adequately account for the genotextual matrix of influences, the semiotic background from 
which any expression of individuality emerges. Instead, we begin from the symbolic, and extend 
its paternal logic as far back as necessary, ignoring the material matrix from which what exists 
was and is continually in-formed. The “bastard logic” of the semiotic is ignored. 
Related to Simondon’s focus on ontogenetics is his theory of information. Boyle explains that for 
Simondon, information is a complex process of becoming or individuating [11; p.22]. An 
important first step toward understand this claim is to appreciate the difference between two 
approaches to what information is and does. The first values information for what it transmits. 
Information associated transmission reduces it to “that which can be transmitted as meaningful 
content between individual points” [12; p.74]. The second associates information with an 
ongoing and dynamic process of transduction. In their book, Physical Computing: Sensing and 
Controlling the Physical World with Computers, Dan O’Sullivan and Tom Igoe define the 
process of transduction in relatively simple terms. It is “the conversion of one form of energy 
into another” [13; pp.xix-xx]. Related to this is Simondon’s more complex description of 
transduction, which Boyle describes as “a signal that changes as it travels across media, 
transversals that might include biological, cultural, and technological registers” [11; p.22]. He 
offers the example of sound as it is is transduced from air vibrations through the diaphragm of a 
microphone, transduced again into an electrical impulse, earbuds, back through air vibrations and 
then through the human ear drum [11; p.22]. Returning to the earlier example of the street light, 
the sequence of transductions include the change of photons of light from the sun to chemical 
reaction in the cadmium sulfide that leads to changes in the analog sin wave of electricity 
coursing through that part of the circuit, which is then transduced into a numerical/digital value 
that can then be used by software to subsequently amplify or attenuate the analog sin wave 
associated with the light level of the street light in another part of the overall circuit. And related 
to the way transductions can affect biological, cultural, and technological registers, in addition to 
the abovementioned technological registers of the process, there are transductive mechanisms 
associated with the human eye (biological) and the sense well-being and safety that associated 
with a well-lit street at night (cultural). 
With this idea of transduction in mind, information is a never-ending process in and through 
which individuation occurs. “Information,” Simon Mills explains, “is the term used to describe 
the individuation process from a number of different perspectives” [12; p.44]. Relatable once 
again to the chora, we can think of information as a verb. Individuality is an ongoing process of 
in-formations, one after the next, born out of a metastable matrix of possibility. Like the 
mother-water in which Simondon’s favorite crystal grows, individuality grows from within the 
metastable ecology of material-maternal forces. Information, in this description, is an amplifying 
structure in and through which transductions occur. Individuality is, after all, a complex set of 
D.M. Rieder 
8 
relations. And based on this unending transductive process of in-formed, serial becomings, Boyle 
argues that rhetorical persuasion is “an exercise in amplifying and attenuating affective forces in 
an ongoing attempt to individuate bodies.” [11; p.88]. In contrast to the classical approach to 
invention, which endeavors to find the available means of persuasion, Boyles posthuman 
approach “repeatedly poses the rhetorical question of ‘what a body can do’?” [11; p.59]. This 
question, which is one that resonates with the Deleuzian-Spinozist definition of a body, looks for 
ways in which to strengthen or weaken some of the affective capacities associated with an 
individual’s metastable ecology; so, echoing Boyles’ definition of persuasion, rhetoric is now 
concerned with discovering the available means of changing the affective dimensions of a body 
in order to change the perceived and/or felt characteristics of a given body. 
This approach resonates with the following quote from Erin Manning’s monograph, Always 
More Than One, from which Boyle quotes. Manning writes, “A body is a complex activated 
through phases in collision and collusion, phasings in and out of processes of individuation that 
are transformed – transduced – to create new iterations not of what a body is but what a body can 
do” [11; p.78, 14; p.19]. So, my argument is that rhetorical practice is the discovery of the 
available means of intervention among some of these processes of individuation. When we 
amplify or attenuate some of the affective relations comprising a given phase of individuality, we 
introduce openings for new iterations to emerge.  
In a post-PC era in which our sense(s) of self – our perceptions of the world; our feelings as 
expressions of affective capacity in the world; our sense-abilities – are inextricably linked to a 
choric-like ecology of devices, changes to that ecology are where a digital rhetor can practice 
this new approach to persuasion. In answer to the question about innovative 
methodologies/practices, for digital rhetors working in and with the sensors, actuators, and 
micro-processes comprising the new post-PC era, we develop interactive environments that, in 
practice, amplify or attenuate some of the relations comprising our sense-abilities of self. 
AMPLIFICATIONS OF DELIGHT: RAIN ROOM 
Earlier, I described the way in which many of the devices comprising the new post-PC era tend 
to work at the periphery of our attention, quietly moving or suading us toward new senseabilities 
of individuality, new perceptions of our world. But for a digital rhetorician developing 
interactive projects, these same technologies can be used in dramatic, overt ways. A “dramatic” 
project that both epitomizes some of the sensory capabilities of the new era and demonstrates 
how (posthuman) rhetorical practices can contribute to a perceived and felt change in self, which 
would signal a moving/suasive experience, the digital interactive installation, Rain Room, is a 
compelling example [15]. 
Rain Room was developed by two of the founding members of the London-based collective 
Random International, Hannes Koch and Florian Ortkrass. The initial installation of Rain Room 
was in the Barbican Gallery in London (2012-2013). Its popularity led to installations at the 
Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York City (2013), the Los Angeles County Museum 
of Art (LACMA) in Los Angeles (2015-2017), the Sharjah outside of Dubai (2018-), the Yuz 
Museum in Shanghai (2015-), and the Australian Centre for the Moving Image (ACMI) in 
Melbourne (2020); it is a part of the permanent collections at the LACMA and the Sharjah. Rain 
Room has been described as the experience of being in a rain storm without getting wet. When it 
opened in 2012 at the Barbican in London, The Guardian’s Architecture and Design critic, 
Oliver Wainwright, said the following on camera [16]: 
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Not only is it raining indoors, but I’m not even getting the slightest bit wet 
wherever I go. It’s almost like I’m giving off some kind of wind that’s pushing 
the rain away. [It] somehow responds to me like I have a magnetic field. 
Wherever I go, it opens up around me. 
Related to the surprise and excitement that Wainwright expresses during his walkthrough of the 
installation, are descriptions like the following in the Australian Design Review [17]: 
Expressions of delight, surprise, disbelief – and often, children especially, 
rushing through the droplets with complete abandon – offer insights into 
visitors’ personalities. The un-ticketed, temporary experience gives an 
immediate response and is also democratic; anyone can play God for 10 
minutes, if only they’re prepared to queue! 
Related to eversion, the experience introduced by projects like Rain Room infuse some of the 
‘unreal’ characteristics of the virtual with the real, contributing to changes in affect that are 
relayed at the symbolic level with words like delight, disbelief, and a sense of something 
freedom associated with the gods. 
Technical specifications about the exact materials and design of Rain Room are difficult to find, 
but a general list includes the following: 2 500 liters of recycled water, a water-management 
system, injection-molded ceiling tiles, a grated floor (for water collection), steel beams, hundreds 
of computer-actuated solenoid valves (water nozzles or valves for the simulation of rain), custom 
software, and 3D, depth-tracking cameras. These materials are part of the choric infrastructure of 
the space. 
Based on that list of materials, we can speculate that they would contribute to the moving or 
suasive experience as follows: the depth cameras around the installation space are used to detect 
and track the movement of people within the space; the custom software would be used to remap 
the 3D data related to people in the space with 2D grid of water valves in the ceiling above them, 
turning them off or on; and the grated floor would enable the rain fall to be collected, returned to, 
and recycled through the water-management system. The effect of all of these materials and 
processes is the experience of walking through a rain storm without getting wet. The water 
valves above one or more people in the installation space are turned off in “real time,” so that a 
roughly six-foot radius around each user remains dry. 
Rain Room is a compelling example of how the paradigm of physical computing can be used 
methodologically as a choric-like structure that in-forms its users toward new atunements – new 
feelings, new perceptions, new relations – with the world. As participants interact with the 
installation, they engage in and experience (read: feel) changes in the capacities of their bodies, 
and those changes can contribute to a change in perception that persists after they leave the 
installation. The project is a compelling example of the ways in which digital rhetors can design 
a suasive environment that leads to changes in the affective capacities of bodies, thereby 
contributing to an ontogenetic change or becoming. In fact, thinking a bit more granularly about 
the ways in which Rain Room as a choric space leads to ontogenetic changes, I will describe an 
experience of being caught in an unexpected rain storm. The feeling of unwanted rain drops 
touching my skin as well as the feeling of clothes that have become heavy, cold, and stuck to my 
body is baseline from which to appreciate what Rain Room accomplishes. 
My memories of being caught unexpectedly in a rain storm are filled with mostly negative 
feelings and emotions, such as frustration or dread or panic. As the rain hits me, I have the sense 
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that I cannot escape it. Related to this feeling, the grandeur of the space in which I’ve been 
walking gives way to something far denser and more opaque. The taps of rain drops on my skin, 
the feeling of cold water streaming down my back, and the heavy feeling of my clothes, all 
contribute to a change in affect as I look for a shelter or the quickest way home. Before the rain, 
unless it’s windy or the sun is very hot, I’m not usually as aware of my body as I walk around. 
But when it is raining, my body becomes conspicuous; I cannot escape it, either, and that idea 
contributes to feelings of frustration. It also contributes to an attenuation in my thinking; I’m less 
able to think broadly or deeply on a subject while caught unawares by a rain storm. Curiously, as 
the rain hits my body, I can intuit the size of the rain drops (and the ‘heaviness’ of the rain) by 
how hard they hit me and the ground; moreover, I can, at first, sense how cold the rain is. If its 
gusty, I can intuit the direction of the wind, too, based on the angle at which the drops hit my 
face, neck, and arms. 
Virtually all of the sensations, feelings, and emotions associated with the (negative or stressful) 
experience of being caught unexpectedly in the rain relate to the human sense of touch. Touch, 
Matthew Fulkerson has argued, “involves a wider range of sensory transducers and informational 
channels than the other senses and has a complex structure closely aligned to both bodily 
awareness and exploratory action” (1). Touch is far more than skin deep, which is why Fulkerson 
states that the “shortcomings in our most basic understanding of the senses and sensory 
awareness” (3). In his book, The First Sense, Fulkerson explains that touch can involve 
noncutaneous forms of awareness, such as proprioceptive awareness as well as the awareness of 
movement (kinetic). It can include the feelings of aches and pains, tingles, itches, twitches, and 
various types of muscle tightness. And as far as concerns cutaneous touch, it can include 
sensations of objects and surfaces that are hot, cold, soft, hard, smooth, and rough. Touch can 
also be experienced distally, which means that we can experience objects with which we are not 
in direct contact. We can feel the roughness or smoothness of the paper on which we are writing 
from the pencil we are holding. And we can track the direction and progress of a pet, like a cat, 
as it makes its way from one end of our bed toward our pillow in the morning. It is not touching 
us directly, but we can “feel each step and track the cat as it navigates around obstacles and 
marches on toward our face” [18; p.145]. The pencil and the bed in these examples are media 
through which distal information is translated or transduced to our “sensory surfaces” [18; p.146]. 
In Rain Room, the experience of being caught in a rain storm – the anxious and negative 
feelings; the inescapability of our body; the frustratingly unstoppable feeling of rain drops hitting 
you; the coldness leaching under our skin; our sopping wet clothings dragging us down 
physically and emotionally – are attenuated. All of the anticipation of discomfort and agitation 
are gone, and in the place of those feelings and emotions are far more uplifting ones, like 
surprise and wonder and delight. The two-dimensional ceiling of water valves in the installation 
space turn off above us, creating a rain-free, three-dimensional space around us, like a spot light 
following us in the dark. Our expectations and the practices of life for which they relate are not 
matched, and the attenuation of the expected experience leads to a concomitant rush of joy and a 
sense of delight as we experience something unexpectedly positive, due to eversive technologies 
comprising the installation, which change the conventional ecological dynamic on which our 
bodies expect such an experience to occur. 
The ways in which Rain Room everts the conventional experience of rain, thereby changing our 
expectations, can be further explained by late-19
th
 century theory of the physiological origins of 
our emotions, which is oft-cited in affect studies. The theory is known as the James-Lange theory 
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because William James and Carl Lange independently published similar arguments within a year 
of each other. Both argued that our feelings and emotions originate in physiological changes in 
our bodies. Conventional wisdom has us believe that our feelings and emotions originate in a 
mental perception, but James and Lange argued that the emotions, i.e., the words that we have 
mapped onto specific ranges of affective changes in our bodies come after. A saying attributed to 
William James’ explanation of the theory, which is found in his 1884 essay, “What is an 
Emotion?”, is the following: we do not run away from the bear because we are scared; rather, we 
are scared because we are running away from the bear. The saying is derived from the following 
lines in James’ essay: 
Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, 
are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The 
hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that 
the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily 
manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational 
statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid 
because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are 
sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. [19; p.190] (my emphasis) 
The point of the James-Lange theory is that the feelings of surprise, joy, and delight in Rain 
Room are expressive of the realization among participants that their expected emotional state is 
not matched by the anticipated ‘bodily manifestations’ of being wet and miserable. That is what 
makes projects like these (and the post-PC technologies on which they are based) so compelling 
for digital rhetoric. What these everting technologies offer digital rhetors is the opportunity to 
change the affective capacity of an interactive space, to change its choric capacities. The change 
in our affective state or capacity occurs before our perception of the event and our emotions 
about it. Rain is a compelling example of what a posthuman, rhetorical practice can be in a post-
PC era of everting, sensory-based technologies.  
CONCLUSION 
As in most humanistic fields in the 21
st
 century, changes in technology, especially those related 
to the new era of post-PC everywares, challenge digital rhetoricians to shift their inventional 
practices. Combining the scholarly approaches to concepts such as chora, eversion, and 
ontogenesis, allows us to view new and innovative possibilities for rhetorical practice. For 
example, rather than beginning (and ending) with an autonomous subject – one who is moved 
primarily by and through language, the origins for change now occur in the choric, metastable 
ecology of devices. From within this ecological milieu, digital rhetoricians design interactive 
environments that have embedded within their interactive logic a way for participants to self-
amplify some of the relational capacities that in-form their sense of self. In other words, by 
interacting with a digital interactive project, like Rain Room, participants engage in their own 
suasion, their own becoming. Boyle’s posthuman practice is a compelling approach to the 
ecology of devices in which we are now imbricated. 
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